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Supply Shock versus Demand Shock

On the whole, new market-rate
housing appears to beneft not just the
region but also the local neighborhood.
Tis suggests that market-rate housing
should be an important part of any
solution to the housing afordability
crisis. Fears of increased rents near
new buildings should not prevent
governments from implementing
desired reforms to regional housing
supply.
We note two important caveats
to our fndings. First, we estimate
an average efect that may disguise
variation across diferent types
of buildings and neighborhoods.
Amenity and reputation efects are
highly subjective and may vary widely
depending on the local context.
Second, the buildings in our sample are
in the types of places that developers
historically have wanted to build.
While these areas are central to the
debate, the efects may be diferent
in other types of neighborhoods.
For example, developers rarely build
market-rate units in very low-income
areas with high vacancy rates, so our
results do not speak to what would
happen if they did.
Notes
1. A census tract is an area with about
4,000 people.
2. Our migration data contain one less
year than our rent data, so we shif the
buildings we study back by one year.

This article draws on research form an Upjohn Institute
working paper, which can be found at https://research
.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/316/.
Brian J. Asquith and Evan Mast are economists at
the Upjohn Institute. David Reed is a community
development economic advisor at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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Efects of
Unemployment Insurance
Reforms in Brazil
Christopher J. O’Leary, Túlio Cravo, Ana Cristina Sierra, and Leandro Justino Veloso
Te Brazilian unemployment
insurance (UI) program was
established in response to a severe
economic recession in the 1980s. It
is now the largest UI program in the
Latin America and Caribbean region,
with more than 40 million benefciaries
between 2012 and 2016. Despite its
size, the program operates in a labor
market where more than one-third of
all employees work in informal jobs
not covered by UI. Because these latter
workers receive no benefts when they
are separated from their jobs, formal
sector employment is desirable, and
previous research has found signifcant
fows of workers between the formal
and informal sectors and back again,
which UI receipt may facilitate. In
particular, some employers may use UI
to subsidize wages of workers they lay
of and then recall afer UI benefts end.
Some laid-of employees even continue
to work informally in their prior
jobs while receiving UI benefts (Van
Doornik, Schoenherr, and Skrastins
2017). Moreover, the UI program has
historically been generous in terms
of minimal eligibility requirements
within the formal sector, which could
further incentivize such back-andforth fows.
Tese features have made Brazil’s UI
program relatively expensive, and when

a recession in 2014 further increased
costs, the Brazilian government
instituted reforms in the eligibility rules
to contain future costs. We investigate
the efects of two such changes in UI
eligibility rules in 2015 that increased
the work experience requirements for
frst- and second-time UI applicants.
While previous research estimated that
these reforms signifcantly reduced
layofs (Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita
2018), our analysis, which relies on
more complete administrative records,
fnds smaller overall reductions in
layofs, with somewhat larger decreases
for workers with a single prior UI
beneft spell.
A Natural Experiment
Te recession that began in early
2014, coupled with the institutional
features of Brazil’s UI program
described above, led to calls for
reforming the system. Facing general
budget difculties and anticipating
a signifcant rise in unemployment,
Brazilian President Dilma Roussef
issued Provisional Measure 665 in late
December of 2014, raising UI eligibility
requirements for frst and second
time UI claimants, efective March 1,
2015. Soon thereafer, the legislature
passed a new law codifying eligibility

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n The Brazilian unemployment insurance (UI) program, established in 1990, is now
the largest in Latin America.
n UI reforms in 2015 increased work experience eligibility requirements for first- and
second-time UI applicants.
n We find reductions in layoffs are greater for workers with one prior UI spell than
for first-time claimants.
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rules nearly as strict as the provisional
measure, and this law took efect on
June 17, 2015. Brazil thus experienced
two sudden changes in UI eligibility
rules in 2015, although these changes
applied only for workers on their frst
or second UI application; rules for the
third and subsequent applications were
unchanged. Consequently, the reforms
were targeted toward recent labor
market entrants.
Specifcally, the reforms increased
the minimum number of months of
employment workers needed before
they would qualify for the shortest
beneft duration on their frst or
second UI application. Prior to the
frst reform, any UI applicant who had
worked six months in the prior three
years could qualify for three months of
benefts (frst row of Table 1). Under
both reforms, frst- and second-time
UI applicants now needed longer
recent work experience to qualify for
the shortest potential beneft duration.
For frst-time claimants, for example,
the new minimum potential beneft
shifed from three to four months, but
the required work period increased
from 12 to 18 months under the frst
reform, before returning to 12 months
under the second reform, a mere four
months later. A summary of the work
requirements for UI beneft eligibility
under each set of eligibility rules is
listed in the Table 1.
Our evaluation focuses on shorttenure workers who were most afected
by the changes in UI eligibility rules.
Using data that contains tenure at the
daily level, we contrast job layof rates
for a treatment group of workers with
at least 6 and less than 7 months of
job tenure against a control group of
workers with at least 5 and less than 6
months of job tenure. Under the initial
regime, the treatment group with 6
months of job tenure was eligible for
three months of UI benefts but frstand second-time applicants became
ineligible for any benefts under both
reforms. We estimate how diferences
in layof risk between the treatment
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and control groups vary across the
diferent regimes, an approach called
diference-in-diferences. To isolate
the impact of the reforms, we further
adjust for diferences across individuals
in their geographic location, calendar
month in the data, and demographic
characteristics.
Efects on Layofs
We fnd that the increase in work
months needed for UI eligibility
reduced employer layofs. For shorttenure workers with no prior UI
applications, the frst reform reduced
layof risk by 0.18 percentage points
(from a base layof rate of 3.4 percent).
Te impact of the second reform
was larger, cutting layof risk by 0.41
percentage points relative to the period
before either reform.
Among workers who had one prior
UI application, the reforms had even
stronger impacts, with the frst reform
reducing layof risk by 0.9 percentage
points (from a base layof rate of 4.0
percent), and the second reform by
1.05 percentage points.
While sizable, these efects are
smaller than those implied by earlier
studies that did not have as detailed
data on the number of prior UI
applications. When we approximate the
methodology of previous studies by not

accounting for the number of prior UI
spells, we estimate a layof reduction
from the frst reform of 0.35 percentage
points, much smaller than earlier

Program costs rose sharply with the
recession starting in 2014 as more
unemployed workers with sufcient
experience drew UI benefts.
estimates of 0.53 percentage points
(Van Doornik et al. 2018) to 0.69
percentage points (Carvalho, Corbi,
and Narita 2018).
Reduction in Collusion
In the United States, UI benefts are
fnanced by experience-rated employer
taxes that rise with total benefts paid
to an employer’s former workers.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, layofs are
lower in states where UI taxes rise more
quickly with experience-rating (Card
and Levine 1994). In contrast, Brazilian
UI benefts are fnanced from general
revenues, and neither employers nor
workers pay specifc taxes to fnance
the program. Consistent with this lack
of implicit penalty for heavily using the
system, Brazilian UI benefts appear to
subsidize the fow between low-wage,
short-term jobs and informal sector

Table 1 Months of Employment Required for UI Benefts, 1990–2017
Number of
UI claim
First

Second

Third or more

Potential
beneft duration

Initial regime
(1990 to Feb. 27,
2015)

Reform 1
(Feb. 28, 2015 to
June 16, 2015)

Reform 2
(from June 17, 2015)

Three
Four
Five
Three
Four
Five
Three
Four
Five

6
12
24
6
12
24
6
12
24

—
18
24
—
12
24
6
12
24

—
12
24
9
12
24
6
12
24

NOTE: The table shows the number of months of formal employment required in the 36 months before UI
application to be eligible for benefts, by number of UI claims and regime.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from provisions in Law 7.998, PM 665, and Law 13.134.
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Figure 1 Both Eligibility Reforms Reduced the Risk of Layofs
Zero prior claims

Impact on probability of layoﬀs

0
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One prior claim

−0.18

−0.4

−0.40

−0.6
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Reform 1

−1
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Reform 2

−1.05

−1.2
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jobs, in some cases back and forth
with the same employer (Doornik,
Schoenherr, and Skrastins 2017).
We fnd the eligibility reforms
afected this behavior, too. For shorttenure workers with no prior UI claims,
the probability of being rehired by the
same employer within 4 to 10 months
of layof fell by 1.3 percentage points
afer the frst reform and 1.8 percentage
points afer the second reform. For
short-tenure workers with one prior UI

claim, the frst reform reduced recall to
the same employer by 1.7 percentage
points, an amount similar to workers
with no prior UI claims. However, the
second reform did not appear to afect
recalls for these workers.
Conclusion
We confrm results of previous
research that Brazil’s 2015 increases
in UI eligibility requirements reduced

Figure 2 Both Eligibility Reforms Also Reduced Job Recall to the Same Employer
Zero prior claims
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layofs. However, our results indicate
that previous studies overestimated
these reductions, likely because they
were unable to precisely measure
individuals’ prior UI requests, a key
parameter undergirding the changes
in requirements. When we account for
prior UI requests, we fnd that changes
in UI eligibility rules reduced the
chance of layof the most for workers
with exactly one prior UI beneft
receipt spell. Our results provide
some evidence that restrictions on UI
eligibility reduced collusion between
workers and employers using UI
benefts to subsidize wages.
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